Opening the source code to a software product often implies that consumers would not pay for the software product itself. However, revenues may be generated from complementary products. A software firm may be willing to open the source code to its software if it stands to build a network for its complementary products. The rapid network growth is doubly crucial in open source development, where the users of the firm's products are also contributors of code that translates to future quality improvements. To determine whether
Introduction
The open source development paradigm has proven very successful in recent years in meeting a wide variety of software needs. Open source projects such as Linux, Apache, and Perl have become enormously successful, trampling bigger and better endowed closed source competitors. Their well-publicized success has inspired tens of thousands of open source programmers worldwide and has given a boost to thousands of smaller open source projects (Schiff, 2002) . In open source development, volunteers -most often users of the softwarecollaborate on the development of the software by contributing code and bug reports and by sharing and disseminating the code. Advantages resulting from this form of development include savings on labor costs, increased creativity associated with freedom from company restrictions, and greater development speed arising from rapid dissemination and higher relevance to end user needs (Raymond, 2001) . The major caveat is that the code is freely distributed, making it difficult to sell that very same code. Given this characteristic of open source development, a firm wishing to pursue this development model must first carefully formulate its revenue model for the project and weigh the productivity benefits and labor savings against the loss of potential revenue for its software product.
Open source program development may not be appropriate for every firm. The decision to embrace this paradigm and the formulation of related strategies such as price, quality, and hiring critically depend on the business model that is used by the firm to generate revenues for its products. Given that the open source code is free, a firm which coordinates and invests its own resources in an open source project generally has a commercially sold product that would benefit from the open source code -by either nesting the code within its own commercially sold product (this strategy would be consistent with the two-layer design, Cusumano and Selby, 1995) , or by exploiting the complementarities that are present between the code and one of its commercially sold products. Although we cannot rule out altruism and social considerations on the part of firms and many firms claim to be motivated by such considerations, we feel it is safe to assume a profit motive in for-profit firms. The public relations aspect of open source sponsorship may be another motive, and the modelling of such benefit is outside the scope of the present work. Haruvy, Prasad and Sethi (2003) In this work we examine a model in a monopoly setting where the open source code is free but complements another product that is sold commercially. The importance of complementarity in software and technology markets with network externalities has been discussed in the economics literature (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2004) . In recent years, the idea of complementarity has received particular attention in the area of platform competition in two-sided markets, where platform owners are separate from the application developers (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2004; Armstrong and Wright, 2004) . Economides and Kastamakas (2004) extend this idea to open source and show that application developers would wish to promote open source. Our work is consistent with these ideas. However, our work is not restricted to platforms and is more general. Secondly, in our work the ownership structure of platform and applications is not separate. Lastly, open source is shown to be more than just a free software or platform.
We show that a closed source can serve as freeware and indeed our analysis finds that the firm in many instances will keep the source closed yet provide it at no charge to generate faster dissemination of its commercial version. The distinction is that open source is an active tool for improving the quality of the software or platform.
The open source business models discussed in the literature (Raymond, 1999 (Raymond, , 2001 Schiff, 2002) suggest several variations on this concept: The Market Positioner model uses the open source code to establish brand name and help the firm's other products. Netscape's Mozilla web browser is an example for such a practice. Netscape's early business model relied upon the sale of server software. The decision to open the source for Mozilla in early 1998 was possibly based on fears that Microsoft would monopolize the browser market, and would eventually drive Netscape out of the server software business (see Raymond, 1999 here can also apply to a freeware software product-a software product which is free but whose code is not necessarily open to the public. However, the key difference lies in the development efforts which are less expensive and more rapid in the open source model. For a discussion of when the freeware model would be most appropriate see Haruvy and Prasad (1998; 2001) .
Note that an open source product in the categories discussed here need not be a full software product. It can be a more limited group of modules or classes for existing open source software. For example, IBM initiates and supports various Apache-related projects and releases related code even when it is developed in-house. IBM's main source of revenue in this case is derived from selling web servers, which benefit greatly from improvements and additions to Apache.
Given the known business models, not every firm should pursue open source as its software model. When a firm decides to pursue a software project, it will generally have an in-house developed prototype and some assessment of the in-house development potential.
If the potential contribution from outside programmers is not perceived to be large, obviously the firm should not pursue open source. Furthermore, when the benefit to the firm's complementary commercial product is small relative to the value of the in-house developed software to the consumers, the firm should keep the software product proprietary and extract as much of the consumer surplus as it can.
We characterize price, quality, and hiring paths for firms under both the open source and closed source models. One interesting finding is that under both open and closed source, the software will initially be free (also known as freeware) if there is no lower bound on the price. Otherwise it will be at its lower bound. In this paper, we assume the lower bound to be zero. That is, if the firm wishes to provide a software product free of charge to boost sales of another product, it may not need to open the source. Interestingly, if the firm selects to close its source, the higher the initial quality of the complementary good, the longer the software will be free.
The optimal decision on opening the source will depend on several factors, including the importance of user contributions, the wages and effectiveness of in-house developers, and the initial qualities of the products. Though it may be optimal for the firm to close the source code, for finitely lived software, open source improves society's welfare in terms of both quality and productivity.
The solution approach taken here is optimal control. This approach is ideal here since the firm is able to vary the price of its commercial products from period to period and since related variables (state variables) such as quality and network size vary over time.
Such approach has been often taken in the literature to address dynamic pricing problems (e.g., Chintagunta and Rao, 1996; Gaimon, 1986 Gaimon, , 1988 Gaimon, , 1989 Gallego and van Ryzin, 1993; Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003) , and dynamic quality problems (Carrillo and Gaimon, 2000; Fine, 1986; Fine and Li, 1988; Mukhopadhyay and Kouvelis, 1997; Kouvelis, Mallick and Mukhopadhyay, 1997; Kouvelis and Mukhopadhyay, 1999; Muller and Peles, 1988) . The approach presented here allows for dynamic pricing and quality in the presence of network externalities. A network effect, or network externality Shapiro, 1985, 1986) , is the idea that utility from a product is increasing in the number of other users. It is a pervasive feature of the markets for software and other information goods (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) .
A network effect implies that the larger the network of existing users the more likely nonadopters are to adopt.
Also note the parallel between the present paper and some works in the innovation diffusion literature. Diffusion is generally defined as the process by which information about an innovation is communicated through a social system (Rogers, 1983) . In essence, diffusion can be thought of a special type of network effect which, when accounting for the dependence between demand and price, translates to a dynamic pricing problem for a product (e.g., Kalish, 1983; Kalish and Lilien, 1983; Nascimento and Vanhonacker, 1988; Sethi and Bass, 2003) .
The approach we take here expands on the above dynamic pricing literature by examining a scenario of two complementary goods, one of which can be developed through user contributions contingent on it being free. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the basic model and assumptions. Section 3 develops the theory and its analytical implications as they relate to dynamics in finite horizon setting. Section 4 pursues numerical simulations for comparative statics and further insights. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains all proofs not included in the text.
The models and setting
The firm has two products, product 1 and product 2, which have different co-dependent demand rates, D 1 and D 2 , respectively. In the case of closed source development, all quality improvements arise in-house as a function of the number of in-house developers (e.g., Cohen, Eliashberg and Ho, 1996; Joglekar, Yassine, Eppinger, and Whitney, 2001 ). In the case of open source development, all quality improvements come from the users, as a function of the size m of the network. Q 1 (t) = The quality of the software at time t. Q 2 (t) = The exogenously given quality of the complementary product at time t. m(t) = Size of network of users (i.e., installed base) at time t. N (t) = Number of in-house developers at time t. P 1 (t) = The price of the software at time t. P 2 (t) = The price of the complementary product at time t.
The profit in a given period is the revenue P 1 D 1 from the software, plus the revenue P 2 D 2 from the complementary product, minus development costs if applicable. In the open source case, P 1 is by definition zero, and so the revenue is only P 2 D 2 . This loss of revenue may be offset partly by the fact that development costs are zero. In the closed source case, development costs increase with the number of in-house developers, N . We assume a cost function of wN 2 in accordance with the economic principle of increasing marginal cost. w is not unit wage but rather a cost parameter. One can think of a generalized cost function wN γ . Given the law of increasing marginal costs, γ = 2 is a reasonable example. In the closed source case, the in-house contributors improve the quality of the software over time.
That is,Q
The parameter k > 0 denotes the productivity or effectiveness of the in-house closed source 
The parameter α > 0 represents the level of involvement by the open source user community, which includes users of both the software and of the complementary product.
In addition to software quality Q 1 (t), we also consider the quality of the complementary product Q 2 (t). We allow Q 2 (t) to be a dynamic variable as long as it is nonnegative. We assume, however, that Q 2 (t) is exogenous to this problem, although it may be endogenous to the firm through variables not considered here.
The size m of the network of users increases each period by the number of new users of both products and decreases by a percentage of the existing users discontinuing the use of the product. The users of both products need not be equally weighted. A user of the software may be more or less valuable to the network than a user of the complementary product. The parameter a > 0 measures this relative weight. We also assume separability between demands for the two products in the network, though the two are complements.
That is, a user who uses both products has the weight of (1 + a) in the network. The parameter 0 < ε < 1 is the rate of depreciation of the network or the rate of exit. Note that the network growth rate is derived from a summation of two implicit separate networks, m 1 and m 2 , where m 1 depends on D 1 and m 2 depends on D 2 . Each network could conceivably have a different exit rate, denoted ε 1 and ε 2 respectively. However, for ease of exposition we assume the exit rates to be the same, resulting in a single ε. Hence,
The demand of the complementary product is
This means that D 2 decreases as the price of the complementary product P 2 increases, and increases as the size m of the network of users and the quality of the complementary product Q 2 increase.
We assume that the demand of the software is
where Suppose the products, both the software and the complementary product, have finite lives with a known terminal period T (0 < T < ∞). The terminal period could be due to an anticipated release of a new generation of products or technologies or due to a known date for the firm to cease operations. We assume the salvage value of both products is
, which is a function of the ending state variables at time T . We assume
We summarize the two models as follows: 
where where
3 Analytical investigation
Open Source
The firm maximizes its discounted (discount rate is ρ > 0) profit stream over the time interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T , plus the discounted salvage value of both products at time T . The instantaneous profit rate consists of the price for the commercial product (the price for the open source software product, P 1 , is zero) multiplied by the demand for the commercial product at each period.
In this problem, P 2 (t) is the control variable at time t. J(P 2 (·)) is the objective function. (0)) is the value function given that we start at time 0 in state Q 1 (0) and
This assumption holds for two common demand functions we use later in the paper. We form the Lagrangian:
From this we get the adjoint equationṡ
The optimal control must satisfy
and the Lagrange multiplier η 2 must satisfy the complementary slackness condition The variable λ is interpreted as the per unit change in the value function for small changes in the software quality Q 1 . In other words, λ(t) is the marginal value per unit of software quality at time t. Similarly, the variable µ is interpreted as the per unit change in the value function for small changes in the size of the network m. That is, µ(t) is the marginal value per unit of the network at time t. The next three propositions show that λ and µ are nonnegative and λ is decreasing over time. These propositions are important because they show that the firm would benefit from higher software quality and network size. We next turn to examining prices. We make a distinction between myopic prices,P 2 (t), and forward looking prices, P * 2 (t). Specifically, myopic prices maximize immediate returns without future consideration, whereas forward looking prices maximize returns over the entire horizon. We show that myopic prices are always excessive relative to forward looking
is the solution to (4). Let m * (t) be the optimal network size corresponding to P * 2 (t) at time t.
if the salvage value is zero at time T .
Proposition 6 is important for several reasons. First, it implies that myopic behavior results in excessive prices. Second, it allows us later on to arrive at an upper bound for the commercial product's price.
Closed Source
The firm maximizes its discounted profit stream over the time interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T , plus the discounted salvage value of both products at time T . The instantaneous profit rate is the revenue of the software and the commercial product minus the development costs at each period. Note that the size of the workforce, N , is now a control variable and not a state variable, as m in the open source case. This latter model is consistent with the extant staffing control literature (Gaimon, 1997) .
In this problem, P 1 (t), P 2 (t) and N (t) are the control variables at time t.
is the objective function. V C (0, Q 1 (0), m(0)) is the value function given that we start at time 0 in state Q 1 (0) and m(0). We assume that
is jointly concave in P 1 , P 2 and N . We form the Lagrangian:
and the Lagrange multiplier η 1 , η 2 and η 3 must satisfy the complementary slackness condition
Proposition 7 The next two propositions show that the firm benefits from higher software quality and higher network size. As in the open source analysis, we make a distinction between myopic prices,P 1 (t) andP 2 (t), and forward looking prices, P * 1 (t) and P * 2 (t), where myopic prices maximize immediate returns without future consideration and forward looking prices maximize returns over the entire horizon. We again show that myopic prices are always excessive relative to forward looking prices. Recall that
is the profit accrued at time t. Let P 1 (m(t), Q 1 (t), Q 2 (t)), P 2 (m(t), Q 1 (t), Q 2 (t)) = arg max P 1 (t),P 2 (t) F C (t). (P * 1 (t), P * 2 (t)) is the solution to (13). Let m * (t) and Q * 1 (t) be the optimal network size and software quality corresponding to (P * 1 (t), P * 2 (t)) at time t. 
Numerical Analysis
We examine different scenarios numerically, in both open source and closed source models.
We assume σ(Q 1 (T ), m(T )) = 0. Therefore, λ(T ) = µ(T ) = 0 . To simplify the calculation, we assume Q 2 is positive and constant for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
We examine two types of demand functions. The first one is the negative exponential demand function, which has several desirable properties (see Greenhut and Greenhut, 1977; Anderson, 1989; Haruvy, Prasad, and Sethi, 2003) . This functional form has the nice property that it precludes the possibility of negative demand. The demand function of the complementary product is
and the demand of the software is
Since the price P 1 for the open source software product is zero, in the open source case the demand of the software is
The positive constant c in equation (27) and (28) The second demand function we examine is linear in price. The demand function of the complementary product is
In the open source case the demand of the software is
We use Fortran code and Excel spreadsheets to find numerical solutions. Due to the computational limitations, numerical solutions are the result of approximations (e.g., Sethi To make our presentation easy, we defineP *
Proposition 13. (i) In the open source model with exponential demand function, the optimal price of the complementary product
(ii) For the linear-price demand function, the optimal price of the complementary product
Proof.
Result follows immediately from Proposition 6 and the demand functions of
The above proposition gives us a "soft" upper bound on price, where "soft" refers to the fact that it is not a prior. However, m itself has an upper bound, which results in a "hard" upper bound for P 2 , where "hard" refers to independence from the trajectories for state and control variables. 
Corollary 2. (i) In the open source model with exponential demand function, the optimal price of the complementary product P *

(t) has a hard upper boundm(t)Q (t), wherē m(t)
=
t). The optimal price of the complementary product
(ii) For the linear-price demand function, the optimal price of the software P * 1 (t) ≤P * 1 (t) = 1 2 (AQ *
(t) − c). The optimal price of the complementary product P
* 2 (t) ≤P * 2 (t) = 1 2 (Bm * (t)Q 2 (t) −P * 1 (t)g(P * 1 (t), Q * 1 (t)).
Proof.
Result follows immediately from Proposition 12 and the demand functions of
h(P 2 , m, Q 2 ) and g(P 1 , Q 1 ). We can see that price in the initial periods, for both software and complementary product is zero. This is because of the network externality effect. In order to build the network and extract the maximal surplus, the producer is willing to sacrifice short-term profits for larger future profits.
The behavior of P 2 (t) over time depends on the parameters, and there are several of them.
The behavior of P 2 (t) is difficult to establish analytically, other than the bounds we show, which are increasing over time. Therefore, we conduct a numerical study of the behavior of P 2 (t) over time. For this, we fix ε = 0.01 and ρ = 0.1, and examine the behavior of P 2 (t) with respect to the remaining parameters.
In the closed source model, hiring is massive early on due to the need to rapidly increase software quality in order to build up the network As a result, we see software quality increases rapidly in the initial time period. Hiring eases up over time and software quality begins decreasing towards the end of the life of the products. This is quite intuitive since given an anticipated product termination and a zero salvage value of software quality at time T , it is <Insert Figure 6 here> Moreover, we find that in the closed source case, the higher the initial quality of the complementary product, Q 0 2 , the longer the price of the software P 1 will remain at zero initially. In addition, the higher the Q 0 2 , the higher the P 2 and the lower the P 1 at the end of the time horizon.
<Insert Figure 7 here> From figure 7, we see that if the quality of the complementary product is high, the firm can charge more for this complementary product and let the software product be free for a longer duration. To the extent that community involvement can be influenced by the firm's efforts or influence, such efforts must complement the pricing decisions evaluated here. In-house programmer productivity was shown to be the opposite side of the same coin. More productive and efficient in-house programmers result in less reliance on open source. However, wage is critical in that respect. If programmer productivity is high but wage is higher than some threshold, our results show that open source would be preferred. Finally, if the initial quality of the software is high, development becomes a less critical consideration and extraction of surplus can begin immediately. In such a case, the firm would prefer to charge a positive price for the software and close the code.
We also characterized price, quality, and hiring paths for firms under both the open source and closed source models. We find that due to network externalities, prices for both products in the closed source model and for the complementary product in the open source model will begin low in order to quickly establish the network's installed base and gradually increase as the network size increases. We find that in the closed source case, the higher the initial quality of the complementary good, the longer the price of the software will remain at zero initially. That is, when more surplus can be extracted from the complementary good, it may be optimal to have the software as a freeware for a long period of time, even when the source is closed.
In the closed source model, quality will rapidly increase early on to build the network size and begin decreasing towards the end of the life of the product. Similarly, hiring will be massive early on and will ease up over time. This is due to the need to rapidly increase quality in order to establish the network. This is not the case in the open source models.
As such, it may be argued that for finitely lived products, open source improves society's welfare in terms of both quality and productivity. 
a solution of (6) for arbitrary P 2 (t) and Q 1 (t). Since m(t) ≥ 0, we can similarly conclude 
is the optimal price trajectory given α. Let Q P 2 (t) 1 (t | α) denote the software quality trajectory given a price trajectory P 2 (t) and α. Similarly, let m
denote the user network size trajectory given a price trajectory P 2 (t) and α. 
(t).
Next we see from (6) that for a given price trajectory P 2 (t) ≥ 0, ∂ṁ(t) ∂Q 1 (t) = ah(P 2 (t), m(t), Q 2 (t)) ∂g(t) ∂Q 1 (t) ≥ 0, which means thatṁ(t) increases with Q 1 (t). This implies that both Q 1 (t) and m(t) increase as α increases for a given price trajectory P 2 (t) ≥ 0.
By the assumption on the functions h and σ, it is apparent that J(
O . This completes the proof.
(b) The proof is similar to part (a).
PROOF to PROPOSITION 3.
From Proposition 2, part (b), we know that
PROOF to PROPOSITION 4. This proof requires Lemma 1.
Lemma 1.
In the open source model,
PROOF to LEMMA 1.
According to (11) and (12), we know that there are two cases:
and
In case 2, [P 2 + µ(ag(0, Q 1 
PROOF to PROPOSITION 5.
The salvage value software quality is zero at time T . Therefore, λ(T ) = 0. By assumption, h ≥ 0 and ∂g ∂Q 1 . From these assumptions and Proposition 4,
Therefore,
Since f (t) ≥ 0, we conclude that λ(t) decreases over time.
PROOF to PROPOSITION 6.
= 0 (from (11)). By Proposition 4 and the assumptions that g ≥ 0 and ∂h
Moreover, if the salvage value is zero at time T , then µ(T ) = 0. From the previous argument, it is easy to show P *
PROOF to PROPOSITION 7. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
PROOF to PROPOSITION 8.
The proofs for part (a) and (b) are similar to that of Proposition 2. (c) Using the Envelope Theorem (e.g., Varian, 1978 , Page 268), we have
dt. Therefore, the optimal closed source profit decreases with w.
PROOF to PROPOSITION 9. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.
PROOF to PROPOSITION 10 .
The proof requires Lemma 2 and Proposition 9.
Lemma 2. In the closed source model, P 1 + aµ ≥ 0 and
PROOF to LEMMA 2. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1.
By contradiction. Suppose at an arbitrarily chosen time τ ∈ [0, T ], µ(τ ) < 0. By Proposition 9 and Lemma 2,
PROOF to PROPOSITION 11.
The proof of λ decreasing is along the lines of Proposition 5. Following (22) and (25),
Since λ(t) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , it must be that N = kλ/(2w) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Therefore, the trajectory of N is the same as that of λ: it starts positive and declines to zero by time T .
PROOF to COROLLARY 1.
From (14),Q 1 = kN − δQ 1 . From Proposition 11, we know the number of in-house programmers N starts positive and declines to zero by time T . Therefore,Q 1 is positive at the very beginning. Also kN declines over time and δQ 1 increases over time as long aṡ Q 1 > 0. Therefore, there exists a time τ such thatQ 1 (τ ) = kN (τ ) − δQ 1 (τ ) = 0. Note thatQ 1 (t) = kṄ (t) − δQ 1 (t) = 0 for t ≥ τ withQ 1 (τ ) = 0. This is a first order equation 
. By Proposition 10 and the assumptions that g ≥ 0 and ∂h
Clearly,P 2 is a function ofP 1 . We denote it asP 2 (P 1 ).
By the concavity of F C , we know that P * 2 (P 1 ) ≤P 2 (P 1 ). Therefore, P * 2 (P * 1 ) ≤P 2 (P 1 ). we conclude P * 2 (t) ≤P 2 (m * (t), Q * 1 (t), Q 2 (t)) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Moreover, if the salvage value is zero at time T , then µ(T ) = 0. From the previous argument, it is easy to show P *
PROOF to COROLLARY 2. (ii) Linear-price demand function. Proof is similar to (i).
PROOF to COROLLARY 3. (ii) Linear-price demand function. Proof is similar to (i). 
